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V. SEC RULE 10b-5
Rule l0b-5,6 12 the most comprehensive of the antifraud provisions
found in federal securities law, has been described as a proscription
of "practically any sin of omission or commission which may be im-
agined in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."'6 13 While
the essence of the rule is that it requires disclosure of material facts,
it does not impose strict liability for misrepresentation or omission.,14
The nature and extent of the additional elements of a private action
under rule lOb-5 are the subject of this section. It will examine the
required state of mind, "scienter," and compare the standard estab-
lished by two circuit courts of appeals. Further, it will ascertain the
relationships among materiality, causation, and reliance, and assess the
burden that proof of these elements places upon a plaintiff alleging
fraud in connection with a securities transaction.
A. Scienter
Common law fraud, the action for deceit, required proof of the de-
fendant's scienter.61 5 Scienter was defined as the intent to deceive, to
612. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
613. Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), citing
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and Drachman
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972).
614. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrris LAW: FAi-uD-SEC RULE lOb-5 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; L. Loss, SECURITIES REGuLATION (2d ed. 1961)
Ihereinafter cited as Loss]; Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities
Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTrINGS L. Rnv. 311 (1974); Cohen, "Truth in
Securities"-Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the
Role of Disclosure, 62 MicH. L. REv. 607 (1964); Whitney, Section 10b-5: From Cady
Roberts to Texas Gulf: Matters of Disclosure, 21 Bus. LAw. 193 (1965); Note, SEC
Rule lob-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 860 (1970).
615. 3 Loss, 1432; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed.
941
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mislead, or to convey a false impression.10 Rule lOb-5 was intended
to express and expand the antifraud coverage of both the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Because the legislative history offered no clear guidance
concerning substantive elements required for a private action under
rule 10b-5, courts have disagreed as to the nature of scienter required
in such actions. 1 "
Initially, the courts promulgated a scienter standard that seemed to
require a general intent to defraud. 18 The minimum culpable conduct
was conscious or intentional misrepresentation. 10 The vast majority of
cases, however, have recognized that the trend is clearly away from en-
forcing a scienter requirement equivalent to the intent to defraud re-
quired for common law fraud.62
1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossER]; see Note. Scienter & Rule lOb-5: Development
of a New Standard, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 495-500 (1974).
616. PRossER 700. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 526 (1938) provides:
A misrepresentation in a business transaction is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes the matter to be otherwise than as represented, or
(b) knows that he has not the confidence in its existence or non-existence
asserted by his statement of knowledge or belief, or
(c) knows that he has not the basis for his knowledge or belief professed
by his assertion.
See PROSSER 700-02. The problem of maintaining an action in deceit for misrepresen-
tation that falls short of actual intent to defraud has troubled the courts since Derry
v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), excluded negligent misrepresentations from the action
for deceit. A minority of courts have refused to accept Derry and have held that deceit
will lie for negligent statements. PRossER 699, 705 n.23.
617. The disagreement among the courts is reflected in the number of commentators
who have attempted to come to grips with the concept of scienter. See Bucklo, Scienter
and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in
Actions under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C.L. Ruv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule 10-b5: Evolution
of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970); Note, supra note 615; Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary
in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH. L. Rnv. 1070 (1965);
Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 824
(1965).
618. See Fishman v. Raytheon, Inc., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951) (an ingredient
of fraud is necessary).
619. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Loss
suggests that the congressional delegation of power in § 10(b) requires some form of
knowledge or intent in private actions because of the words "manipulative or deceptive."
3 Loss 1767. See Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-
Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH. L. Rnv. 1070 (1965).
620. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham, & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Glo-
bus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
993 (1970); Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir, 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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As shown in later cases, the courts have differed in formulating a
scienter test for private actions under the rule. Second Circuit cases have
cited the language in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,62 that "some
form of scienter is required." 62 As a minimum, something more than
negligence is necessary before liability will attach.623  Another line of
cases has indicated that scienter is not necessary, but it is not clear
whether these cases are merely stating that no specific intent to defraud
is necessary or whether they are attaching liability for negligent mis-
representations. 2
621. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
622. Id. at 855.
623. See Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC
v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law Re-
search Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 993 (1970);
Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); SEC
v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920
(1969).
624. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (good faith and due diligence constitute defense); Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970) (proof of specific intent
to defraud unnecessary); Gilbert v. Nixon, 424 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970) (defense
exists if defendant did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have
known that he made misrepresentation or omission of material fact); Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1238 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (10b-5 ap-
plies to negligent as well as intentional misrepresentations); City Nat'1 Bank v. Vander-
boom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1080 (1970); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (proof
of scienter, i.e., knowledge of falseness of impression produced by statement or omission
made, not required); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) (necessary
only to prove one of prohibited actions such as material misstatement of fact or omission
to state material fact); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (knowl-
edge of falsity or misleading character of statement not required); Royal Air Properties,
Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (10b-5 requires only proof of material
misstatement or omission of fact to establish prima facie case); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (if Congress intended to limit authority to create regulations
to those proscribing common law fraud, it would have said so); Bachelor v. Legg & Co.,
52 F.R.D. 545 (D. Md. 1971) (need merely to show lack of due diligence or unreason-
able or negligent conduct by defendant). See also 3 Loss 1430-44. But see Bucklo,
supra note 617, at 590 (footnotes omitted):
Language embracing a negligence standard, or a standard less stringent than
one of actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth, has in every in-
stance been used in cases where the defendant's conduct was clearly violative
of a higher standard, in cases arising on a motion to dismiss or in cases in
which the court found an alternative reason to find no liability. In those few
cases where defendant's conduct might be said to constitute negligent be-
havior, but not knowing or reckless behavior, no liability has been found.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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1. The Second Circuit Approach
As recent cases indicate, the majority of the Second Circuit has fol-
lowed the dictum enunciated in Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.6 25
that knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is sufficient
to satisfy the scienter requirement in private actions while a mere
negligence is insufficient.6 26 In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp.627 the court stated that it is unnecessary to allege specific
intent in order to state an action under rule lOb-5, but that mere negli-
gence is insufficient to meet the scienter requirement. 2 Chris-Craft sets
out the standard which has been followed in later Second Circuit cases:
The scienter requirement is met if the defendant either knew the essen-
tial facts and failed to disclose them or failed and refused, after being put
on notice of a possible material failure in disclosure, to apprise himself
of the facts under the circumstances where he could reasonably ascertain
them without any extraordinary effort.0 29 Thus, liability attaches either
for what the defendant knew or, in certain situations, what he should
have known.
Professor Bromberg termed this latter possibility "constructive knowl-
edge." 630  Ilis suggestion, implicit in the Second Circuit decisions,
would require some type of knowledge, implementing a due care
criterion through a constructive knowledge standard which requires dili-
gence.6 " This would be in line with modem developments in the defini-
tion of scienter, moving past the traditional standard requiring actual
knowledge of the falsity to a standard under which the defendant would
be liable if he knew or should have known of the falsity or omission
if he had used due care in investigating.6 32
Other Second Circuit cases have held that the negligent failure to dis-
cover material facts when such facts could have been ascertained with-
625. 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
626. Id. at 445. i'ee Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353
F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (defendant employees of defendant brokerage house knew
or should have known that adverse information concerning corporation, in defendant's
possession as managing underwriter, was confidential and could not be used to tip other
customers).
627. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
628. Id. at 362; see Republican Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
629. Id. at 398 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
630. 2 BROMBERG § 8.4(531), at 204.161.
631. Id. § 8.4(504), at 204.105-.106.
632. See 3 Loss 1771-78; Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under
SEC Anti-Fraud Rule 10b-5, 63 Mica. L. REv. 1070, 1075 (1965).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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out inordinate effort, is not, by itself, sufficient to establish liability in
a private action under rule lOb-5.633 Liability can only arise if such
failure to discover material facts is preceded by the defendant's knowl-
edge of the misstatements or omissions, 63 1 notice to the defendant of
the misstatements, or omissions, occurrences constituting reasonable
grounds to believe that misstatements or omissions existed,6 35 or a de-
fendant's failure to fulfill a duty to investigate, if the facts could have
been uncovered by reasonable investigation. 36  Thus, in Cohen v.
Franchard Corp.,637 rule lOb-5 liability did not arise when the facts indi-
cated that the defendant promoters had no knowledge and were not on
notice that a limited partner was diverting corporate funds. Without
knowledge or notice, the promoters were not under a duty to investigate
even though they had an opportunity to do so and the facts would have
been uncovered by reasonable investigation.638
In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,63 9 the court again refused to impose lia-
bility after examining the facts. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argu-
633. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1974).
634. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane); Cohen v.
Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1974).
635. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1974).
636. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
637. 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1974).
638. Upholding the trial court's charge which required a showing of "actual knowl-
edge or reckless disregard for the truth," the Second Circuit stated the test: "Mhat
defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated . . . and should have
realized their significance, or failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts when
they were readily available to him and he had reasonable grounds to believe that they
existed." Id. at 123. It has been argued, however, that the holding in Cohen centers
upon the court's view of whether misstated or omitted facts were "readily available"
or "could have been ascertained without inordinate effort" with liability attaching in the
case of the former, but not in the latter. Note, supra note 615, at 524-26.
The court in Stewart v. Bennett, 362 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1973), in denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, explained the holding in Cohen in terms
of an inference of recklessness. The district court stated that in the absence of actual
knowledge, notice is the key; thus, the critical element missing in Cohen was reasonable
grounds to suspect falsity. The court went on to say that a "failure or refusal
to discover, and thereafter disclose, misrepresentations and omissions, in the face
of notification as to their possible existence, amounts to a wilful and reckless dis-
regard for the truth such as to constitute knowing and intentional conduct. . . . (AIl-
legations of mere failure to discover and disclose material facts that were omitted or dis-
torted would be nothing more than an assertion of negligence and would not constitute
a lob-5 violation." Id. at 607.
639. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ment that the defendant's position as a director by itself imposed a duty
to investigate.6 40 The majority affirmed the trial court finding that the
defendant, an outside director, neither knew nor should have known
of misstatements and omissions about the BarChris business and finan-
cial position, and held that the outside director was not liable in failing
to advise the plaintiffs of such facts. The court found that the defend-
ant was not aware nor even suspicious of any deceptions practiced upon
the plaintiffs, and that the inquiries and investigation he did make were
sufficient as a matter of law to satisfy rule 10b-5 . 41 The court held
that, absent knowledge of or participation by a director in the dissemi-
nation of false information, an outside director is under no affirmative
duty to insure that all material adverse information is conveyed to pro-
spective purchasers of the company's stock.
42
The court refused to apply a negligence standard as the measure of
culpability necessary to constitute a violation of rule 1Ob-5. Such a duty
640. Victor Billiard Company, plaintiff, entered into an agreement with BarChris to
exchange all outstanding Victor shares for BarChris shares. During the negotiations
BarChris made material misrepresentations and omissions concerning the financial status
of BarChris. Defendant Coleman was an outside director and a member of an invest-
ment banking firm with interests in BarChris. Coleman did not participate in any of
the negotiations. He did gain knowledge of some negative corporate developments and
management difficulties after negotiations were completed but before the deal was
closed. Id. at 1283-86. The court held that no rule 10b-5 violation was stated against
Coleman because he had assumed, and had no reason to suspect otherwise, that the Victor
shareholders had been made aware of all these developments during negotiations.
641. Id. at 1304.
642. Id. at 1302. The duty to which the court referred was the duty to investigate
rather than the duty to disclose, which was also considered in the opinion. See id. at
1281:
[Neither the language nor intent of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 would justify
a holding (1) that a director is an insurer of the honesty of individual officers
of the corporation in their negotiations which involve the purchase or sale of
the corporation's stock or (2) that, although he does not conduct the negotia-
tions, participate therein, or have knowledge thereof, he is under a duty to in-
vestigate each such transaction and to inquire as to what representations had
been made, by whom and to whom, and then independently check on the truth
or falsity of every statement made and document presented.
Were a contrary result to be reached it would, in effect, place an affirmative
duty on Coleman (and all other directors) to intervene personally in every
transaction involving the sale or exchange of his corporation's stock and would
amount to a holding that a director's vote of approval for any such transaction
negotiated and concluded by others, without his knowledge or participation,
would be a representation to such purchasers that the director personally had
inquired as to the facts upon which the negotiations were based and that he
was satisfied that all representations were correct.
See also Note, supra note 615, at 577 (confusion resulted in case because court disre-
garded separate duties to investigate and to disclose, referring to them as duty to con-
vey).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
Vol. 1974:815] SECURITIES REGULATION 947
would have required the director to ascertain whether BarChris' finan-
cial status had been fully and adequately disclosed even though the di-
rector had no notice that disclosure was incomplete or inaccurate. 643
Where the outside director maintained an awareness of significant cor-
porate developments and considered any adverse material developments
coming to his attention, he met his responsibility even though he knew
disquieting facts about the corporation.6" The majority held that lia-
bility under rule lOb-5 could arise only upon proof of a willful or reck-
less disregard of the truth.6 45
One judge, dissenting, disagreed with the finding that the director
exercised due care in the investigation which he undertook.640 Where
his knowledge and experience required further inquiry, the director
should be held liable, if, had he investigated the sources of information
to which he had ready access, he would have been apprised that the
material facts had not been disclosed.64  Another dissenter, Judge
Timbers, agreed that a failure by the director to inform himself of the
progress of negotiations after being put on notice of their existence was
a breach of duty.64 This dissent took the position rejected by the ma-
jority, that the director owed a duty to investigate solely by reason of
his position as a director and that negligent failure to do so was ade-
quate basis for liability.649
643. 479 F.2d at 1305.
644. Id. at 1306. The court justified the scienter requirement on the ground that lia-
bility for mere negligence would deter competent individuals from serving on corporate
boards. Id. at 1307.
645. Id.
646. 479 F.2d at 1320-22. Judge Timbers pointed out that because Coleman's reck-
less disregard for the truth was clearly demonstrated, it was not necessary to reach the
question of negligent liability in a private action under rule lOb-5, though he specified
that he did not necessarily disagree with a negligence standard.
647. Id. at 1321.
648. Id. at 1318 (Hays, J., joined by J. Smith, Oakes, and Timbers, 1.1., dissenting
in part).
649. Id.:
As a director, Coleman had a duty to keep himself adequately informed as to
the activities of the corporation. He could no more close his eyes to the pur-
chase of Victor than he could to other important corporate developments ...
Although Coleman knew that BarChris's condition had worsened consider-
ably, he made no effort to ascertain whether [that information had been con-
veyed] to the Victor shareholders. Coleman's vote to approve the exchange
of shares was a representation to plaintiff purchasers that he had sufficiently
inquired as to the facts upon which the negotiations were based and that he
was satisfied with the correctness of those facts. The representation was false.
The dissent also pointed out that previous Second Circuit cases rejecting negligence as
insufficient to meet the requirement of scienter did so in dicta, and thus the Second
Circuit had not yet decided the scienter-negligence issue. Id. at 1319.Washington University Open Scholarship
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As can be seen in Lanza, semantic confusion has arisen because the
constructive knowledge standard embodies the tort-derived concepts of
recklessness and negligence. The constructive knowledge standard re-
lates both to the knowledge of the facts stimulating inquiry and to the
failure to fulfill a duty of acquiring information. 110 As Professor
Bromberg has pointed out, where the defendant does not use reason-
able diligence in learning the facts, the existence of which he has rea-
sonable grounds to believe, and is therefore negligent in a tort sense,
the effect is the same as constructive knowledge-holding the defend-
ant liable for what he should have known.651 If the facts cannot be
learned in the exercise of reasonable diligence, even though the
defendant is on notice, the defendant is not held liable for constructive
knowledge.
The concept of notice, however, requires some type of knowledge by
the defendant. Thus, the majority and the Timbers dissent in Lanza did
not differ in finding the requisite notice gave rise to a duty of the
director to inquire into the facts. But once the defendant has the re-
quisite knowledge of the facts that would put him on notice, he "could
not avoid liability by pleading ignorance where his knowledge and ex-
perience tell him that certain events or circumstances known to him
require that further inquiry be made. '652
The Hays dissent, with which three members of the Second Circuit
concurred, would have imposed a duty to investigate because of the
defendant's position as a director rather than because the defendant
was placed on notice.6 53 Using this standard, knowledge of the facts
would not be required to trigger the duty to investigate.60" The dissent
reasoned that "as a director, the outside director had a duty to keep
himself adequately informed as to the activities of the corporation," and
a negligent failure to investigate reasonably, with the resulting failure
to ascertain the facts required to be disclosed to the plaintiff, should
make the defendant liable under rule 10b-5 under a negligence stan-
dard. If the courts followed this standard, any corporate carelessness
would satisfy the scienter requirement, thus justifying the broad lan-
650. 2 BRomERG § 8.4(432), at 204.162.
651. Id.; see Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
903 (1969).
652. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1321 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
653. Id. at 1318.
654. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom., Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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guage in Texas Gulf that included negligence in its definition of "some
form of scienter. ' '65
While the Second Circuit has required more than mere negligence
in private actions under rule lOb-5, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc.656 held that mere negligence is a sufficient basis for liability in an
SEC enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief A57
In upholding the district court's finding of liability, the court held that
even if there were no evidence that the selling shareholder-defendants
acted in bad faith, they should have been put on notice that the prog-
ress of the offering did not comport with the arrangement described
in the prospectus. 5 " Nevertheless, the court did not find it necessary to
clarify "[w]hether their conduct be termed lack of due diligence or
negligence. . .. "6-1
By failing to clarify whether negligence or lack of due diligence pro-
vided the basis for the injunction, the court did not provide an answer
for the hypothetical situation in which the defendant's negligence re-
sults in his not being placed on notice. As the Second Circuit has held,
liability attaches for failure to investigate reasonably only after notice
has triggered the duty to investigate; the question of negligent liability
in a private suit arises once again. The test set down in Cohen0 ° has
left open the possibility that if the defendant had reasonable grounds
to believe that facts existed that would put him on notice, he is held
to a duty of reasonable investigation. Thus, for example, if the defend-
ant director negligently fails to open the mail containing the cor-
porate minutes and thus negligently fails to put himself on notice, liabili-
ty would arise. The liability here, though, would be for merely negligent
conduct since there was no notice to trigger the duty to investigate. To
hold a defendant liable under the constructive knowledge rationale in
such a situation would be to impose rule 10b-5 liability for mere negli-
gence.
2. The Ninth Circuit Approach
While two later cases outside the Second Circuit have rejected the
655. Id. at 855.
656. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
657. But cf. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), where the court
in remanding to the district court, stated that "the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
Lanza fully supports our conclusion that the SEC's proof in an injunctive suit must mnet
the standard of showing 'wilful or reckless disregard for the truth."'
658. 458 F.2d at 1097.
659. Id.
660. See note 758 supra.
Vol 1974:81:5] 949
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need for scienter without reinforcing the reasoning used to justify a
negligence standard in earlier cases,661 the Ninth Circuit has rejected
all standards based solely upon state of mind. Thus, White v.
Abrams6 2 represents another attempt by the federal courts to move
away from the elements of common law fraud in cases involving rule
lOb-5. 663 The White court called for a case-by-case analysis, investi-
gating the duty imposed upon the defendant by rule IOb-5 in the specific
factual context rather than using the traditional fault analysis of com-
mon law fraud. 6" In reviewing the framework of analysis used by the
Second Circuit, the White court approved the initial inquiry as to the
duty of disclosure that the law should impose upon the defendant. The
court, however, disapproved of overlaying this inquiry with a scienter
or culpability requirement. 665
The White court moved away from a rigid compartmentalization of
common law fraud requirements toward a sliding scale of various fac-
tors used to determine the appropriate duty of the defendant toward the
661. Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 525 (7th Cir.
1973) (Sprecher, I., concurring) (scienter not an element of proof); Lane v. Midwest
Bancshares Corp., 347 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (scienter need not be shown).
662. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
663. 495 F.2d at 728. In rejecting a trial court instruction imposing strict liability
for material misrepresentations by the defendant, the court cited the earlier Ninth Cir-
cuit opinions in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), and
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), as early indications, and Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), as the logical culmination of the current
trend to modify or eliminate common law elements of fraud as applied to claims
brought under rule 10b-5.
664. 495 F.2d at 731. The court went on to say that
[a~lthough the [Ute] Court did not discuss the scope of the duty imposed by
clause (b) of [rWle 10b-5], we believe it is significant that it considered a
number of factors such as the defendant's relationship to the plaintiffs, the ben-
efit the defendants derived from the sale of the stock, the access the defend-
ants had to the undisclosed information as compared with the access of the
plaintiffs, and the activity of the defendants in encouraging the plaintiffs to
sell their stock.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
665. Id. at 732. While the White court acknowledged that the standard in Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), accurately re-
flected the various courts' decisions as to the state of mind sufficient for recovery under
rule 10b-5, it recognized the anomaly of this result. The Second Circuit enunciated a
standard that imposed no liability for mere negligence, but simultaneously set forth a
negligence standard for those persons on notice and thus invested with a special duty
to investigate. In criticizing both Chris-Craft and Lanza, 'the White court deemed the
Second Circuit's requirement of some degree of scienter or culpability to be an unfor-
tunate limitation upon the duty of disclosure imposed by rule 10b-5. 495 F.2d at 732-
33. The court went on to approve the position taken in the Hays dissent (and rejectedhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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plaintiff.s 6e In addition to providing a flexible standard to meet varying
factual contexts, such a sliding scale focused upon the duty of the de-
fendant without clouding the issue with fault concepts traditionally used
in 1Ob-5 cases. 667 In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit consciously rejected
any state of mind requirement as a necessary and separate element of
a rule lOb-5 action 668 and thus rejected any set formula for the deter-
mination of lOb-5 liability in favor of a loose set of guidelines gleaned
from earlier rule lOb-5 actions. 6 9
While the White court emphasized that the rejection of the
scienter standard as a separate element did not eliminate it as an impor-
tant factor in determining the scope of duty imposed by rule lOb-5,670
the Ninth Circuit's new standard is actually no standard at all. A sliding
by the Lanza majority) that the duty to investigate and inform arises solely from the
duty inherent in the position of a director and controlling person without considering
if them was any negligence in the investigation following notice to that individual. Id.
at 733.
666. 495 F.2d at 734; see Mann, supra note 617.
667. 495 F.2d at 734.
668. Id. at 734-35 (footnote omitted):
In this circuit, we have never adhered to the requirement of scienter in the
common law fraud sense. While we did not apply liability without fault, our
language in Ellis and Royal Air was apparently construed'by the district court
to create such a standard. Such a construction is erroneous. It is also errone-
ous to construe those cases as imposing a negligence standard or any other
standard that focuses solely upon state of mind and its various compartmen-
talizations. We believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that any
attempt to limit the scope of duty in all lOb-5 cases by the use of one standard
for state of mind or scienter is confusing and unworkable. Consequently, we
reject scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a necsssary and sep-
arate element of a lOb-5 action. The proper standard to be applied is the ex-
tent of the duty that rule lOb-5 imposes on this particular defendant. In mak-
ing this determination the court should focus on the goals of the securities
fraud legislation by considering a number of factors that have been found to
be significant in securities transactions.
669. Id. at 735. While the White court states that it would be inappropriate to list
all the factors to be considered in determining the defendant's duty under rule lOb-5,
it did give a partial list, emphasizing that the list was not exhaustive and that a court
is not precluded from making additions or adaptations in a particular case:
[W~e feel the court should, in instructing on a defendant's duty under rule
lOb-5, require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant to the
plaintiff, . . . the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship, the
defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their relation-
ship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's activity in initiat-
ing the securities transaction in question.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The White factors and adaptations therefrom were applied in
Jackson v. Bache & Co., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (investigation by defend-
ant broker was adequate).
670. 495 F.2d at 736.
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scale of liability gives no guidance regarding mental state and cul-
pability,8 71 and raises the dangers of judicial Monday-morning quarter-
backing in which culpability in the plaintiff-defendant relationship may
be determined in light of the outcome. In making state of mind one
of the factors to be considered, the Ninth 'Circuit combined it with
other factors that involve the relationship between parties in securities
transactions. The notion of scienter does not fit into a conceptual
framework dealing with duties imposed by the parties' relationship.
The standard laid down in White would allow liability to be imposed
upon a defendant based upon his status alone, a sharp break from the
long line of cases that imposed liability only upon a finding of culpa-
bility based upon the individual's state of mind.17 1
3. Conclusion
Recent Second Circuit cases illustrate that court's reluctance to
relax the scienter requirement in private actions under rule lOb-5. By
requiring that a defendant be "to some extent cognizant" of misrepre-
sentations or omissions, the Second Circuit has resisted the general trend
toward relaxation of the elements of proof with respect to reliance, causa-
tion, and materiality. This trend has been recognized and applied by
the Ninth Circuit. That court has rejected state of mind as a separate
element of a rule 10b-5 case and has accepted in its stead a sliding scale
of factors to determine the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff.
B. Materiality, Reliance, and Causation
1. Introduction
By adopting rule lOb-5, the SEC expanded the common law tort ac-
tion of deceit6 78 to encompass fraud in securities transactions.07 4 At
671. While the White court gave polar extremes concerning liability, id., it did
not give any shape to the vast gray area between the two extremes.
672. See Note, Intent to Deceive and the Outside Director's Duty to Disclose Under
Rule lOb-5, 25 SYRAcusE L. REv. 575, 578-80, 595 (1974). See generally Bucklo, supra
note 617.
673. See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965): "It is not necessary
to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule.
It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material mis-
statement of fact or the omission to state a material fact," See also Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
814 (1961).
For a discussion of common law deceit, see generally PRossER 683-736.
674. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933):https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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common law a plaintiff must show, along with scienter and some evi-
dence of privity, 75 that a fact has been misrepresented,6 76 that the fact
was material, 7 7 that the plaintiff has relied upon the misrepresented
fact,6 7 8 and that in so relying the plaintiff has been caused injury.679
It has been held that the common law elements were incorporated by
reference into rule 10b-5.680
This section will discuss the metamorphosis of the materiality, reli-
ance, and caustion elements, with the Supreme Court case of Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States681 as the focal point. Concentration will
be placed primarily on lower court treatment of the Supreme Court de-
cision.
mhe common-law liability was not consciously and especially moulded for
the flotation of securities. Instead, general tort and contract law, developed
largely in connection with other transactions, was applied piecemeal to securi-
ties cases as they came before the courts.
675. Unlike equitable rescission, there is no requirement of absolute privity in an ac-
tion for deceit. 3 Loss 1628.
676. Complete failure to disclose a material fact (a "pure omission") does not give
rise to an action for deceit unless the nondisclosing party prevents the other party from
obtaining the information or the two parties are in a fiduciary or similar relationship.
3 Loss 1433-35.
677. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 538(2) (1938):
A fact is material if
(a) its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would
attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question,
See 3 Loss 1431; PROSSER 718-20.
678. 3 Loss 1432; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 525, 546 (1938). Reliance serves as
a limiter of liability. It would be unjust to grant recovery to one who would believe
in statements that are clearly contrary to fact in light of the information available to
him. See PROSSER 715-18.
679. Reasonable reliance raises a necessary inference of causation since it is the ma-
terial inducement that would lead plaintiff to act or forbear to his detriment. Note that
reliance supplies causation for entering into the transaction, and, in the absence of any
intervening factors not germane to the transaction, causation of the loss will necessarily
follow. PROSSER 732. Cases under rule lOb-5 have not discussed the cause-of-transac-
tion and cause-of-loss distinction. See 2 BROmBERG § 8.7(2). This discussion may not
be necessary, given the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "in connection with" lan-
guage in rule 10b-5. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12-13 (1971).
680. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965). Professor Loss argues that "[b]ecnuse of the legislative background
[of the federal securities laws] it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the
most liberal common law views on these questions should govern .... " 3 Loss 1435.
681. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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2. The Law Before Affiliated Ute
Although rule 10b-5 requires a finding of "materiality," it does not
define the term.68 2 The courts, however, have fashioned a definition: A
material fact is one to which a reasonable investor would attach impor-
tance,6 13 The term "reasonable investor" includes both unsophisticat-
ed68 4 and professional investors. 685 The test of materiality is an objec-
tive one. 686
While the text of rule lOb-5 does not mention reliance, it has been
included by the courts since it is a basic element of the tort upon which
the rule is based. Reliance is measured by both an objective and a subjec-
tive standard. Objectively, the plaintiff must have acted as a reasonable
investor would have acted when confronted by the misrepresentation or
omission.687 Subjectively, the plaintiff must have in fact relied.6 88 The
682. The only promulgated definition of the term "materiality" is in rule 405 of Reg-
ulation C of the 1933 Act, which provides:
The term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to a subject, limits the information required to those matters
as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed be-
fore purchasing the security registered.
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1974). The SEC has not followed this definition in 10b-5
actions. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1962) (material facts are
those which if known would affect investment judgment of person with whom insider
deals).
683. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). One variation of this definition emphasized what
"might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities." Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum). List and Texas Gulf Sulphur both incor-
porate this criterion as something to which the investor would attach importance.
684. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963).
685. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
686. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 811 (1965); 6 Loss 3876-80.
687. "mhe test of 'reliance' is whether 'the misrepresentation is a substantial factor
in determining the course of conduct which results in [the recipient's] loss.'" List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965),
quoting REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938). See Note, The Nature and Scope of
the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. REs.
L. Rav. 363, 368 (1973) (footnotes omitted):
The element of reliance operates to establish the causal connection between the
defendant's fraud and the plaintiffs actions. Causation is the ultimate fact
that must be proved, and reliance is the only acknowledged way to prove causa-
tion in misrepresentation cases.
Under the objective reliance standard the court will look only to how the reasonable
investor would have acted under the circumstances. Thus, if no investor would have be-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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Second Circuit summarized these requirements:
Thus to the requirement that the individual plaintiff must have acted
upon the fact misrepresented, is added the parallel requirement that a
reasonable man would also have acted upon the fact misrepresented. 689
Although causation plays a central role in tort law,190 it has received
little treatment in rule 10b-5 cases.89' Most courts have adopted a
causation-in-fact test692 that is merely a restatement of the objective
test of reliance. 93 Another possible test of causation can be found in
the "in connection with" language of the rule.694 In this context the
question is one of proximity between the fraudulent scheme and the
loss.09 5 The Supreme Court has held that this proximate relation need
lieved the misrepresented fact, plaintiff could not have relied-that is, the reliance was
not reasonably justified. See Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under
Rule l0b-5?, 42 FORD. L. REv. 243, 249 (1973).
688. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). Recovery will be defeated if the plaintiff had constructive or actual knowl-
edge of the truth or could have discovered the truth through a reasonable investigation.
See, eg., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (plaintiff's familiarity with business matters is con-
structive knowledge); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968) (reasonable investigation would have revealed truth), citing Kohler
v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 641-42 (7th Cir. 1963) (plaintiff's knowledge of corpora-
tion's internal workings is constructive knowledge). In each of the cases cited it could
be said that the plaintiff did not "reasonably rely." Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5:
Is the "Reasonable Investor" Reasonable?, 72 COLuM. L. REv. 562 (1972), lists five cat-
egories of cases in which unreasonable reliance can arise: (1) the plaintiff has general
business experience or expertise; (2) the plaintiff is acquainted with the affairs of the
corporation; (3) the plaintiff has access to the information misrepresented; (4) the
plaintiff initiated the transaction; (5) the defendant owes plaintiff a fiduciary duty. Id.
at 567-75.
689. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965) (emphasis original).
690. 6 Loss 3882, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934): "a violation must
be 'a legal cause of the invasion' of another's interest."
691. 2 BROMBERG § 8.7(1).
692. Chasims v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970). See
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
693. 2 BROMBERG § 8.7(1).
694. Professor Bromberg has noted that the causation requirement must be "squeezed
out." Id.
695. The notion of proximity is not, however, used as it is in tort law as a limitation
of liability. Rather, the phrase is keyed towards the scope of investor protection, and
must be broadly construed:
[it seems clear from the legislative purpose Congress expressed in the Act,
and the legislative history of Section 10(b) that Congress when it used the
phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" intended onlyWashington University Open Scholarship
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be no more than a "touching" of the securities transaction that ulti-
mately led to the loss. 96
In cases where individual plaintiffs allege fraud, the problems of
proving reliance or its absence do not appear to be too onerous. In
class actions, however, determining whether each plaintiff in fact relied
under the circumstances becomes judicially unworkable, for example,
when the plaintiff class is composed of a thousand or more members.09 7
Courts have recognized, however, the important role Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 98 plays in effectuating the policies of the
securities laws, 699 and have adjusted the reliance requirement accord-
ingly.700 These adjustments have resulted in a transformation or elimi-
nation of the reliance requirement in class actions.701 Reliance remains
relevant to the threshold determination of common questions of fact 702
that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause
reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith, so relying,
cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
696. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1972):
"The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of decep-
tive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." See Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964): "[The outlawed activity is not
limited to the portion of the transaction involving an exchange of consideration by the
purchaser for the stock."
697. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382 n.5 (1970). See generally
Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. CHr. L. REv. 337 (1971).
698. Fa. R. Civ. P. 23.
699. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965): "In our complex modem economic system where a single
harmful act may result in damages to a great many people there is a particular need
for the representative action as a device for vindicating claims which, taken individually,
are too small to justify legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a group."
See also 3 Loss 1819: "The ultimate effectiveness of the federal remedies ...may de-
pend in large measure on the applicability of the class action device."
700. In response to defendant's argument that all the plaintiffs (at least 1200) might
not have relied on the misrepresentations, one court said: "List [a case calling for proof
of objective and subjective reliance] was not a class suit. It involved only one plain-
tiff." Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930
(1969).
701. "[Pirocedure's very function is to modify the substantive law." Hazard, The
Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 299, 307
(1973).
702. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added) requires:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impractical, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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and the requirement that the common questions predominate over
questions affecting individuals. 703 If either of these requirements is not
met, the motion to proceed as a class will be denied.704
One solution to the problem of reliance in class actions is to proceed
with the merits of the plaintiffs' claim and, in a second trial, deal with
the individual reliance questions.70 5 This solution may be appealing
logically, but it does not solve the problem of bringing thousands of
class members into court.700 A variation of the split-trial device is to
subclassify the plaintiff class according to degrees and kinds of reli-
ance.70 7 This procedure, however, would be as unworkable as the split-
trial, since the varying degrees of reliance would have to be identified
by examining each class member. The optimal solution, for conveni-
ence of judicial administration, would be to eliminate reliance as an
element of rule lOb-5. In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,70 8 the Third Circuit
held that "[p]roof of reliance is not an independent element which
must be alleged to establish a cause of action."709 The court, relying
on Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,710 reasoned that proof of materiality
established reliance by inference. 711 In Kohn v. American Metal Cli-
max, Inc.71" the Third Circuit retreated from its position in Kahan and
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
703. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of sub-
division (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to all the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members ....
704. See Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Jacobs v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
705. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
706. See Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (referring to the
split trial device as a "harrowing experience" that could "transform a litigation into a
gigantic burden on the Court's resources beyond its capacity to manage or effectively
control").
707. Kroneberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
708. 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
709. Id. at 173.
710. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
711. 424 F.2d at 173-74.
712, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
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held that reliance was a necessary element, but that it could be "pre-
sumed" from a showing of materiality. 13 This is consistent with the
approach taken by other courts that reliance exists a priori in certain
securities transactions.7 14 While the courts have not developed a single
formula for elimination of reliance in class actions, it is apparent that
individual reliance will not be required.
3. Affiliated Ute Citizens
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States7 15 the Supreme Court modi-
fied the standards for determining materiality and reliance under rule
10b-5. The case involved the making of a secondary market for shares718
in the Ute Development Corporation (UDC)7 17 by two employees of
the bank designated as transfer agent for UDC. The employees pur-
chased shares for non-Indian buyers and sold at prices generally higher
than were paid to the Indians.7 18 The Court affirmed the district court's
holding that failure to disclose the market-making activities violated
rule 10b-5719 and thus reversed the court of appeals holding that there
was no violation of the rule unless the record disclosed evidence of re-
liance on material fact representations by the employees.7 20  The Court
held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All
713. Id. at 269.
714. See, e.g., Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162-63 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 930 (1969) (shareholders rely on honesty and fair dealing of management);
Weisman v. M.C.A., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 258, 259-60 (D. Del. 1968) (same).
715. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
716. The stock involved represented half-blood Ute Indians' interests in the tribal as-
sets, the distribution of which was provided for by the Ute Partition Act of 1954, 25
U.S.C. §§ 677-77aa (1970). Each certificate bore a legend which advised the holder
about the interests represented by the share and stated that the certificate should be
retained for the benefit of the shareholder and his family. 406 U.S. at 137-38.
717. UDC was incorporated in 1958 to manage jointly with the Tribal Business Com-
mittee, representing the full-blooded Utes, the distribution of the tribal assets. 406 U.S.
at 136.
718. UDC shares were purchased by the employees, on their own account and for
others, at prices ranging from $300 to $700 per share and were resold in the secondary
market for $500 to $700 per share.
719. Reyos v. First Security Bank, Civil No. 39-65 (D. Utah, filed April 18, 1969),
reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at App. A, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
720. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970), afl'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that
a reasonable investor might have considered them important in the mak-
ing of this decision. 721
This holding was significant in two respects. First, the standard of
materiality was gauged by what the reasonable investor "might" do rath-
er than what he "would" do. The "might" standard was taken from the
Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,72 2 which involved
rule 14a-9 72 3 and not rule lOb-5. The "would" standard has been taken
from SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.724  The distinction between
"might" and "would" is crucial because the former denotes possibility
and the latter denotes probability. 725 Consequently, what "might" af-
fect the reasonable investor encompasses a wider range of information
than what "would" affect him. Apparently, the Court applied the for-
mer standard to effect what it conceived to be the policy of the 1934
Act. 26 Secondly, proof of reliance was eliminated as a necessary ele-
721. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added). The Court made no specific mention
of any misstatements or half-truths by the bank's employees, although this fact was
suggested by allusion:
It is no answer to urge that, as to some of the petitioners, these defendants
may have made no positive representation or recommendation. The defend-
ants may not stand mute while they facilitate the mixed-bloods' sales to those
seeking to profit in the non-Indian market the defendants had developed and
encouraged and with which they were fully familiar.
Id. at 153. The Court was obviously more concerned with the defendants' silent deceit,
and it is reasonable to hypothesize that the Court found all plaintiffs to be injured by
the nondisclosures. See 1973 UTAH L. REv. 119, 133.
722. 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (footnote omitted):
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to
be "material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably
embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might
have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the
process of deciding how to vote.
723. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1974) provides in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement . . . containing any statement which, at the time and in light of the
circumstances under which it was made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements therein not false or misleading .. . .
724. 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969).
725. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973). See
sources cited in notes 733-39 infra and accompanying text.
726. 406 U.S. at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963): "The Court has said that the 1934 Act and its companion legislative
enactments embrace a 'fundamental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full dis-
closure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry."'
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ment of rule lOb-5 for private damage suits alleging nondisclosure.
This was an advance beyond the common law and prior lOb-5 cases.727
More specifically, this holding eliminated a fictional reliance require-
ment, that plaintiff rely on the absence of information.728
The Court closed its discussion of rule 1 Ob-5 with a reference to the
causation requirement: "This obligation to disclose and this withhold-
ing of a material fact establish the requisite element of causation in
fact. '7 29 By itself, this statement was not a significant departure from the
prior law. With the elimination of reliance, however, the Court changed
the context of causation-in-fact. As noted above, objective reliance was
used to establish causation. The Court appears to have by-passed the
reliance-causation criterion and substituted a materiality-causation cri-
terion. As precedent for its causation statement, the Court cited the
holding of Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.:
To the extent that reliance is necessary for a finding of a 10b-5 viola-
tion in a non-disclosure case such as this, the test is properly one of tort
"causation in fact." . . . Chasins relied upon Smith, Barney's recom-
mendations of purchase made without the disclosure of a material fact,
purchased the securities recommended, and suffered a loss in their
resale. Causation in fact or adequate reliance was sufficiently shown
by Chasins.730
Affiliated Ute went beyond this statement. The question of "adequate"
reliance in nondisclosure cases is meaningless. Causation, and ulti-
mately liability, are established by a duty to disclose a material fact and
subsequent nondisclosure. As a result, the importance of a particular
plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of undisclosed material
facts is questionable. 731'
4. The Law After Affiliated Ute
Lower court interpretations of Affiliated Ute have not been uniform.
727. See notes 682-714 supra and accompanying text. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc,,
340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), the court said that the
proper test for reliance in nondisclosure cases was "whether the plaintiff would have
been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him
the undisclosed fact." But cf. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787,
797 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp.,
374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967).
728. The requirement of reliance in nondisclosure cases is fictional because it necessi-
tates proof of a negative. See 2 BROMBERG § 8.6(1).
729. 406 U.S. at 154.
730. 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis added).
731. See The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAv. L. REv. 52, 270 (1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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The seemingly clear language in which the Court expressed the materi-
ality test and the rejection of reliance in nondisclosure cases has been
interpreted and applied in various ways.
a. Materiality
AHiliated Ute changed the test of materiality from what "would" af-
fect the reasonable investor to what "might' affect him.732  The Second
Circuit, however, has declined to follow the Supreme Court. In Ger-
stle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.733 Chief Judge Friendly, writing for the
court, applied the "would" test to proxy statements contested under
rule 14a-9. 3 The court distinguished the "might" test in Mills on the
ground that the issue presented in Mills was causation. Therefore, the
definition of materiality "must. . .be read as a characterization of the
minimum that all would agree was 'embodied' in the district court's con-
clusion that the defect was material . ... 7", Affiliated Ute, on the
other hand, dealt with reliance, and thus that definition of materiality
was not controlling. 73 6 The court further noted that the majority opin-
ion in Mills modified its "might" standard to include material facts that
"19737
"'have a significant propensity to affect the voting process ....
What is especially striking about the Gamble-Skogmo decision is the
court's concern for the consequences accruing to the defendant. "When
account is taken of the heavy damages that may be imposed, a standard
tending toward probability rather than toward mere possibility is more
appropriate." 738 This position is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
practice of construing the securities laws flexibly to effectuate their
broad remedial purpose.739
732. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Allen Organ Co.
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See generally The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, supra note 731, at 269; 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119, 121.
733. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
734. See text quoted note 823 supra.
735. 478 F.2d at 1301; accord, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th
Cir. 1974); P. JEmlNNGs & H. MAMSH, SECUTIEs REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS
1354-55 (3d ed. 1972).
736. 478 F.2d at 1302 n.21. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
737. 478 F.2d at 1302, quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970) (emphasis original).
738. 478 F.2d at 1302.
739. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent
Vol. 1974:815] 961
Washington University Open Scholarship
962 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
In Broder v. Dane, 40 the "might" and "would" standards were fur-
ther confused. The court, faced with the question of the proper material-
ity standard to be applied under the anti-fraud provision of the Williams
Act,741 held:
[It is this Court's judgment that the instant case calls for the standard
of materiality tending more toward a reasonable possibility than toward
probability, thus requiring something more than mere possibility, but
something less than probability. 742
If "mere possibility" is interpreted as de minimus materiality, the
court's decision can be justified. Clearly rule 1Ob-5 is not a strict lia-
bility provision. A standard of probability would seem to exclude that
class of plaintiffs who lack sufficient understanding of securities mar-
kets to make sophisticated investment decisions. A standard of rea-
sonable possibility, on the other hand, would assure some connection
between misrepresented or undisclosed facts and an investment deci-
sion743 without excluding unsophisticated plaintiffs.
b. Reliance
Although the Supreme Court has clearly rejected reliance as an ele-
ment of rule lOb-5, the requirement has nonetheless survived in vari-
ous contexts. Three basic themes have been pursued by the lower
courts: reliance has been eliminated; reliance can be presumed from
materiality; and reliance of some kind is a necessary element.
(i) Reliance Has Been Eliminated. In Swanson v. American Con-
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. National Sec. Co., 393
U.S. 453 (1969); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
740. 384 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
741. 1934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). It has been held that the proper
standards for finding a violation of § 14(e) are the same as those applied under rule
10b-5, Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
742. 384 F. Supp. at 1321 (emphasis original; footnote omitted).
743. This connection is important in that a finding of materiality of an undisclosed
fact gives rise to a finding of causation-in-fact. See text accompanying notes 730-31
supra. It is one of the goals of the securities laws to protect the unsophisticated in-
vestor. See text accompanying note 684 supra. If the level at which certain infor-
mation becomes actionable rises above the level of those the law seeks to protect, causa-
tion might never be found for the unsophisticated. It is to be remembered that certain
investors will believe anything they are told.
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sumers Industries, Inc.,7 4 the Seventh Circuit applied Affiliated Ute to a
shareholders' derivative action challenging a merger. Plaintiffs asserted
injuries caused by a merger that was effectuated by allegedly mis-
leading proxy statements, and sued for rescission of the merger and
for damages for loss of statutory appraisal rights. The court upheld the
merger as fair,745 assuming, but not deciding, that causation between
the proxy materials and the merger had been established by the ma-
teriality of the omissions in the proxy statements. 48 Regarding the loss
of appraisal rights, the court noted that it had previously remanded the
case
for a factual determination of whether a causal relationship existed be-
tween the deficiency in the proxy statement and the loss of statutory
appraisal rights. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Mills, causation
and reliance are no longer factually-to-be-proven predicates to recov-
ery.747
The Swanson court followed this statement with a quotation from
Affiliated Ute.71 This decision highlights the proposition that reliance
and causation are not factual matters, and that causation arises by opera-
tion of law. Judge Sprecher's concurring opinion stated the case more
forcefully:
[Tihe district court erred as a matter of law in requiring proof of causal
connection under the circumstances of this case.
Under the "obligation to disclose" standard of Affiliated Ute Citizens,
the withholding of a material fact or facts, as here, established the requi-
site elements of causation in fact.749
744. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
745. The court held the district court's finding of the fairness of the merger terms
not clearly erroneous. In addition, the unscrambling of the merger would work injustice
to other shareholders. Id. at 519.
746. By assuming that causation did not have to be shown, the court avoided a direct
holding on the question left open by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385
n.7 (1970): whether causation could be shown where the management controls a suffi-
cient number of votes to effect the transaction without any minority approval. 475 F.2d
at 518-19.
747. 475 F.2d at 520.
748. Id. at 520-21, quoting 406 U.S. at 153-54.
749. Swanson v. American Consumers Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 523 (7th Cir.
1973) (Sprecher, J., concurring); accord, Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D.
Ohio 1974); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1973); SEC v.
Lur's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rock-
well Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117 (R.D. Pa. 1973); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 353 F. Supp. 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Several rule 10b-5 class action cases, decided before Affiliated
Ute,750 anticipated the Supreme Court's reasoning. In approving settle-
ment of a non-disclosure case, one court stated: "[P]roof of reliance
no longer appears to be a serious problem in securities cases such as
this."' 751 Another court noted that the defense of non-reliance "no
longer has any substantial merit." 752 As a result, the question of factual
commonality required by Rule 23(a)(2) will be limited to the materi-
ality of the misrepresentation or omission. 753
(ii) Reliance Can Be Presumed from Materiality. In Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 54 the Second Circuit applied the
reasoning of Affiliated Ute to a suit brought under the antifraud provi-
sions of the Williams Act755 and rule lOb-5.755 The decision was the
court's second arising out of the tender-offer battle between Chris-Craft
and Bangor Punta Corp. for control of Piper Aircraft.7 57 One of the
questions presented concerned the district court's conclusion that there
was no causal connection between the alleged violations758 and the
defeat of Chris-Craft's tender offer.759 The circuit court began its
750. See notes 697-714 supra and accompanying text.
751. In re Brown Co. See. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 574, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
752. In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
See Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 58 F.R.D. 436, 442 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
753. See In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, 64 F.R.D. 443, 450 (S.D. Cal.
1974) (dicta); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 63 F.R.D. 39, 42 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
754. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
755. 1934 Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
756. Note the court's discussion of the applicability of the two provisions, 480 F.2d
at 359:
Although the fraudulent acts involved in the instant case literally are pro-
scribed by Rule lOb-5, we conclude that § 14(e) is the antifraud provision
which more appropriately provides the basis for CCI's standing to sue here.
Apparently, the court did not wish to meet the dilemma of the Birnbaum rule, which
would require Chris-Craft to prove an injury as a "purchaser or seller" of securities. See
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
757. The Second Circuit's first decision is reported at 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970)
(en banc).
758. Specifically, Chris-Craft complained about misrepresentations in the Piper man-
agement's press release and letters to Piper shareholders, and Bangor Punta's failure to
disclose to the Piper shareholders that it was engaged in negotiations to sell one of its
subsidiaries, the Bangor and Aroostock Railroad.
759. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The district
court's reasoning was summarized by Judge Timbers in the instant case: ' The court con-
cluded that CCI was seeking damages as a 'defeated contender for control' without show-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawrevi w/vol1974/iss5/5
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causation analysis by noting that reliance was essential to Chris-Craft's
case: "CCI must show that there was a misrepresentation upon which
the target corporation stockholders relied and that this was in fact the
cause of CCI's injury. ' 7 0 The court then added that this reliance was
not actual but "constructive," and in impersonal transactions, such as
here, prior decisions had spoken in terms of "materiality. ' 76 1 This
"constructive reliance" was a doctrine, originally set out in Mills,
which "established a presumption of reasonable reliance in order to
avoid an overly difficult burden of proof. '7 2 Judge Timbers cited
Affiliated Ute as a case in which the presumption of reasonable reliance
was used,7 6 3 and concluded:
In applying the Mills-Ute test to the instant action, we presume that
the Piper shareholders would not have accepted the BPC exchange offer
but for the misrepresentations to which we have referred above ...
Piper shareholders had a third option, i.e., to hold their shares, which
presumably they would have chosen if all material facts had been dis-
closed. 764
Judge Mansfield, concurring and dissenting, took issue with Judge
Timbers' analysis and pointed out that neither Mills nor Ute spoke of
''presumptions":
Use of that term naturally raises further questions: Is the presumption
to be conclusive or rebuttable? If rebuttable, should not BPC be given
an opportunity. . . to rebut the presumption by offering proof that the
percentage of Piper shareholders who did not rely upon its alleged mis-
representations in tendering their shares was sufficient to enable BPC
to achieve control?765
ing that 'a single exchanging Piper shareholder would have refrained from the exchange
and taken an offer for his shares from Chris-Craft instead of that from Bangor Punta.'"
480 F.2d at 373, quoting 337 F. Supp. at 1139 (emphasis of district court).
760. 480 F.2d at 373.
761. Id. at 374.
762. Id.
763. Accord, Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., BNA SEc. REG. & L. RP. No. 249,
at A-7 (E.D. Pa. April 17, 1974).
764. 480 F.2d at 375 (emphasis added).
765. Id. at 400 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting). In Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974), the court said:
We do not read this decision to say that the question of reliance vel non may
not be considered at all in a non-disclosure case, but only that proof of reliance
is not required for recovery. If defendant is able to demonstrate that there
was clearly no reliance, that is, that even if the material facts had been dis-
closed, plaintiff's decision . . . would not have been different from what it
was, then the non-disclosure cannot be said to have caused the subsequent loss
Vol. 1974:815]
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The point is that talk of "presumptions" brings the reliance requirement
back in after it has been specifically excluded .7111 Judge Mansfield of-
fered this interpretation of Affiliated Ute:
[Whatever may have been our earlier views as to the necessity of ad-
ducing positive proof of reliance. . . the gravamen of the offense is now
the material misrepresentation itself, from which reliance by a reason-
able investor may be inferred as a matter of law .... 7 7
The strength of the presumption or inference of reliance, and how it
may be rebutted, has been developed in subsequent cases. In Rochez
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades,7 68 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rea-
soned that if the "defendant is able to demonstrate that there was clearly
no reliance,. . . then the non-disclosure cannot be said to have caused
the subsequent loss . . ,,769 The burden of proof, the court pointed
out, "rests squarely upon defendant."770 The court also noted that if
the plaintiff was an insider, which Rochez was, 771 he had to "fulfill a
duty of due care in seeking to ascertain for himself the facts relevant
to [the] transaction."' 2  This duty of an insider to investigate is
equivalent to holding, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff cannot have
relied on a defendant's representations of those matters to which he
had 6qual access or knowledge.
In Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc.,77 z the materiality of omitted facts
was challenged on appeal. Harnett was a departing employee who sold
.... However, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Affiliated Ute, the
burden of proof rests squarely upon defendant to establish the "non-reliance"
of plaintiff.
766. 480 F.2d at 400.
767. Id. at 399.
768. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
769. Id. at 410. See note 765 supra.
770. 491 F.2d at 410.
771. Rochez was president of Rochez Bros., Inc. and vice-president and a director
MS&R, Inc. He acted as agent for Rochez Bros., Inc., in its sale of 50% of the issue
and outstanding stock of MS&R, Inc., to Rhoades. Id. at 405.
772. Id. at 409, citing Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973), Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422
F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). The court pointed out, though,
that "a plaintiff cannot fail in his duty of due care if he lacked any opportunity to de-
tect" the omission. 491 F.2d at 409, citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124 (4th Cir. 1970), City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, supra, Lehigh Valley Trust
Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
773. 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
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his shares to the corporation. 774 Affirming the district court's finding
that the omitted facts were not material, the Third Circuit reviewed the
circumstances of Harnett's particular situation.77 i The court noted that
when ... there is single buyer allegedly hiding facts from a single
seller it is difficult to divorce consideration of the probable effects of the
unrevealed facts from the particular circumstances of the solitary seller.
Indeed, it may be argued that the distinction between the objective ma-
teriality test and the subjective reliance test breaks down in such circum-
stances. 77
6
The greater the weight given to the particular circumstances and the
more atypical the plaintiff, the more subjective the test of materiality
becomes. Since materiality and reliance are distinguished by their objec-
tive or subjective nature, 777 reliance may again become a requisite ele-
ment of a rule lOb-5 action.
A defendant faced with a case of presumed reliance may raise three
defenses. Relying on Rochez Bros. he may attempt to prove "that there
was clearly no reliance," 778 or that plaintiff has failed to prove fulfill-
ment of his duty of due diligence, 779 or, relying on Harnett he may em-
phasize the circumstances of the situation that render the undisclosed
facts immaterial.780
(iii) Reliance Has Not Been Eliminated. The language of Affiliat-
ed Ute has been construed by some courts in such a manner that reliance
has remained a requisite element of a rule lOb-5 action. In Simon v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 781 the Fifth Circuit held,
notwithstanding Affiliated Ute, that "some element of general reliance"
774. Id. at 833-34. Harnett named the closely-held corporation and its chief execu-
tive officer as defendants in an action alleging nondisclosure of the officer's thoughts
concerning possible employee participation in an impending public offering of the corpo-
ration's stock. Employee participation would have permitted Harnett to sell his 1000
shares to the public, rather than to the corporation at book value as required by an
agreement covering employees. The district court characterized the officer's thoughts
as "speculation." Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 889 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
775. 496 F.2d at 837-38.
776. Id. at 838 n.20.
777. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). Compare REsTATEMENT oP TouTs § 546 (1934), with id. § 538(2)(a).
778. 491 F.2d at 410; see sources cited notes 665-70 supra and accompanying text.
779. See notes 891-92 supra and accompanying text.
780. 496 F.2d at 837-38; see sources cited notes 675-77 supra and accompanying text.
781. 482 F.2d 880 (Sth Cir. 1973).
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must be shown.7 82  The court distinguished Affiliated Ute by noting
that it "did not involve, as here, a general lack of reliance by the plain-
tiffs on the defendant's representations. ' 783  Although it is not clear,
the Simon court apparently held that a finding of subjective nonreli-
ance by plaintiffs on the general body of defendant's representations
was a bar to recovery in nondisclosure cases.
The Fifth Circuit elaborated on its Simon holding in Vohs v. Dickin-
son.784 The court explained that the holding in Affiliated Ute
must be confined to making proof of specific reliance on particular omis-
sions unnecessary when the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff
placed some general reliance upon the defendant's disclosing material
information.78 5
Since the plaintiffs had sought expert advice in addition to defendant's
representations 7 1s and had given no great credence to defendant's state-
ments in making their decision, the defendant's omissions were of little
importance. Rather than evaluating this fact pattern as involving facts
which were immaterial, the Fifth Circuit employed its notion of "general
reliance."
Several courts have barred recovery on the theory that plaintiff was
not a "reasonable investor" or that the misrepresented or omitted facts
were not material to the particular plaintiff. In Kohner v. Wechsler'7 17
the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint based on rule
lOb-5. The court quoted the district court: "'[T]he plaintiff, an
experienced businessman and a sophisticated investor, had many
782. Id. at 884 (emphasis added), citing Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434
F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971), Grumbles v. Times
Herald Printing Co., 387 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). See
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974).
783. 482 F.2d at 884. The Fifth Circuit's stance on reliance is somewhat contrary
to the Supreme Court's, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153
(1972) ("positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery"), but can be sup-
ported by noting the Supreme Court's language in Affiliated Ute that plaintiffs "consid-
ered these defendants to be familiar with the market for the shares of stock and relied
upon them when they desired to sell their shares." 406 U.S. at 152, cited in Simon v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1973).
784. 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974).
785. Id. at 622 (emphasis original).
786. id. at 624: "The record presents a picture of aggressive purchasers who took
it upon themselves to ascertain the status of the company and its stock, not persons who
passively relied on the knowledge and advice of the seller."
787. 477 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1973).
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financial advisors to assist him .. . ,. In his majority opinion,
Judge Moore did not address this statement, but Judge Timbers, con-
curring, quoted the materiality test from Affiliated Ute and concluded:
[T]he testimony of Kohner's expert witness, an attorney experienced in
customs matters, indicated that after successful mitigation of the total
potential liability, Wecolite probably would have been subject to an as-
sessment of less than $4,000. In a sale involving a purchase price of
$650,000 plus extensive additional consideration, the conclusion that
$4,000 would not constitute a factor that a reasonable investor would
have deemed important in the purchase decision would seem to be rea-
sonable.7819
The Fourth Circuit has also resolved the question of reliance by re-
placing it with materiality. In Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,790 the
plaintiff sought to rescind its purchase of oil and gas production pay-
ments, alleging that the defendant's employee had misrepresented and
omitted material facts concerning the estimated net revenues to be real-
ized from the oil and gas reserves. Rather than applying Affiliated Ute
to misrepresentations, 79' the court held: "[Alssuming that in a case
such as this some degree of reliance is necessary, we think the essentiality
of the tainted information satisfies the accepted criteria of reliance
which were delineated in List. .. .
In Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., Inc.793 a district court applied the
"reasonable investor" test 794 of materiality in denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against
a broker alleging rules 10b-5 and 15cl-4795 violations in the broker's
788. Id. at 667, quoting Kohner v. Wechsler, Civil No. 72-1898 (S.D.N.Y., filed June
16, 1972).
789. 477 F.2d at 673-74 (Timbers, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See Puma
v. Marriott, 363 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. Del. 1973): "Materiality cannot be established
on the basis of trivial or insignificant defects, or those only tangentially related to the
transaction for which the proxy is solicited."
790. 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
791. See Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
792. 488 F.2d at 915. Hutton petitioned for certiorari on January 30, 1974, asserting
that the Fourth Circuit had improperly adopted the "materiality causation" standard of
Mills and Affiliated Ute. Hutton argued that since this was a misrepresentation case,
specific reliance had to be shown. As authority for its position, Hutton cited Kohner
v. Wechsler, 477 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1973). Huttop's petition was denied. Hutton v.
Johns Hopkins Univ., 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
793. 358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973).
794. See source cited note 689 supra and accompanying text.
795. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1974).
Vol. 1974:8151 969
Washington University Open Scholarship
970 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:815
failure to disclose its market-making activities. The court noted that
while proof of actual reliance was not necessary,706 proof that the plain-
tiff acted as a "reasonable investor" was required to establish materi-
ality:
Judicial pursuit of the "reasonable investor" has led most often to a con-
sideration of the fact constellation of each case including the relationship
of the parties, the experience of the investor, the nature of the transac-
tion and the nature of the omitted fact. ... The reasonable investor
of substantial business acumen presumably would more diligently test
the reliability and completeness of representations made concerning a
proposed transaction before considering them important than would one
of lesser acumen.797
Although the Taylor court recognized that reliance is unnecessary, it
permitted a showing of the same evidence that would substantiate sub-
jective non-reliance.70 8 The court distinguished the "reasonable inves-
tor" for purposes of a private suit and a suit brought by the SEC.700 In the
latter, the "reasonable investor" is "prototypal" since the Commission
seeks relief on behalf of all investors.8 00
The crux of this group of cases appears to be their consideration of the
particular circumstances surrounding the transaction. Whether the
court labels the problem as one involving an atypical investor, reliance,
or materiality, it may be said of each case that it involved a face-to-face
transaction in which the disclosure of the hidden information might or
796. 358 F. Supp. at 895.
797. Id.
798. Id. at 896. The court also noted that "the application of an objective mate-
riality test usually results in the consideration of surrounding circumstances." Id. at 895
n.8.
79. Id. at 895 n.9. Compare source cited note 689 supra and accompanying text,
with Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir.
1974), and General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
800. 358 F. Supp. at 895 n.9. Although this position may be attractive in the context
of limiting liability under rule lOb-5, with regard to the purposes of the 1934 Act's anti-
fraud provisions it is not correct. "[The] policy of vigorous enforcement through pri-
vate litigation has been the instrument for forging many salutary developments in the
securities fraud area, including the broadening of standing to sue and a relaxation of
the elements of proof in a private action." Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (dictum). See
J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946). The Supreme Court has not set out criteria for the interpretation of the "reason-
able investor." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss5/5
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might not have made a difference. There is really no need to talk about
reliance or atypical investors at all-the court should simply find that
the undisclosed information was or was not material, i.e., would or
would not have been considered important by a person in the same
or similar circumstances.
5. Conclusion
In summary, the precise language of Affiliated Ute should be re-
called: In cases "involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof
of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." 01 The Court focused on
the materiality of the facts withheld. It was sufficient that "a reason-
able investor might have considered them important in the making of
the decision."80 2 Rule lOb-5 creates a duty to disclose material facts.
If a fact is material, proof of nondisclosure establishes the element of
causation and, ultimately, liability.
The language of Affiliated Ute has been applied to a myriad of fact
patterns. Proof of the materiality of an omission should serve to supply
the requisite causation element in class action cases, rather than proof
of subjective reliance by each individual plaintiff. In anonymous mar-
ket transactions, where plaintiff and defendant have no direct contact,
again the materiality of the undisclosed information should serve to
supply the reliance element. In face-to-face transactions, where ma-
terial facts are hidden, the mere materiality of those facts coupled with
the statutory duty to disclose should be sufficient to establish liability.
In the particularly troublesome cases involving atypical investors,
concepts of reliance should not be permitted to confuse the analysis.
Courts should simply assess the importance of the undisclosed informa-
tion to an investor in the same or similar circumstances. These circum-
stances may include the plaintiffs own knowledge, as in Harnett,80 3 or
his recourse to expert advice, as in Vohs.804 Such a "sliding scale" of
801. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
802. Id. (emphasis added).
803. Harnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974); see notes 773-80
supra and accompanying text.
804. Vohs v. Dickinson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); see text accompanying notes
784-85 supra. Note also the particular circumstances considered in Taylor v. Smith,
Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892 (D. Utah 1973). See notes 793-800 Yupra and accom-
panying text.
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materiality is consistent with the tort theory that underlies rule 10b-580
and with the flexible nature of the securities laws. The crucial
issue is the importance of the undisclosed facts; sufficient importance,
however defined, coupled with non-disclosure should suffice to yield
liability. The seemingly clear language of Affiliated Ute, that "[a]ll
that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material,"80 can be con-
sistently applied only by focusing on the concept of materiality, not reli-
ance. By emphasizing the need to disclose the important facts sur-
rounding a transaction, the disclosure policy of the 1934 Act can be
effectuated.
805. See notes 673-80 supra and accompanying text.
806. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
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